This is the V2 risk-score methodology — the 0–100 composite that the V3 vault surface maps to a letter grade. For the V3 framework (seven weighted categories, composite letter grade, criteria taxonomy) see Vault Risk V3. The 0–100 score here is the same value V3 reports as
composite.score.Every number in the score can be traced back to a specific signal. The API exposes the full sub-score breakdown so we can tell a user “this vault scores 78/100 because redemptions are currently closed and the admin key is an EOA with no timelock” — not just a number.
Letter grade
The 0–100 composite maps to a letter grade via the standardgrading_scheme=v2 scale (lower risk = better grade):
See the full grading contract.
Outputs
Sub-scores
The weight shows how much it contributes to the final composite.Contract and Code Quality
Governance and Control
Liquidity and Exit
Performance and Market Behavior
How these sub-scores map to V3 categories
In V3, you’ll see these V2 sub-scores regrouped into seven weighted risk categories. The mapping below is a conceptual correspondence — it shows where each signal appears, not the exact scoring wiring (the V3 composite is computed from its own framework, not by re-bucketing these V2 weights).hack_exploit_history is driven by the additive penalties and risk flags below (for example, recent exploit, ownership transfer, repeated pausing) rather than a single weighted sub-score. chain_infrastructure is reserved and carries no V2 signal today.
For details on what each V3 category measures and representative criteria, see What each category measures.
Oracle Type Quality
The oracle sub-score uses a weakest-link model — the worst oracle type found across all of the vault’s underlying markets sets the floor. Oracle quality is scored by type:
Additionally: any collateral token with <$5M daily trading volume raises the oracle sub-score floor to 55 (
thin_collateral_market flag). Below that volume threshold, a well-capitalised attacker can move the price enough to overborrow against inflated collateral — the pattern behind the Mango Markets and Cream Finance exploits.
